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V 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). 
H. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
III. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Procedural History 
Intermountain Health Care Heath Services, Inc. ("IHCHS"), as landlord, brought a 
lawsuit to enforce its rights under a certain lease agreement (the "Lease") between 
IHCHS and appellant D&K Management, Inc. ("Appellant" or "D&K"), as tenant. The 
property subject of this lawsuit is currently being developed into a hospital complex and 
is located at approximately 5100 South State Street, Murray, Utah. D&K operates a 
private club at the location known as "The Southern Exposure." 
Factually, it is undisputed that D&K failed to pay rent as specified in the Lease in 
March 1998, such rent not being paid within 10 days of the date due. It is undisputed that 
the Lease provides the landlord the right, among other options, to terminate the Lease if 
the tenant fails to pay rent for a period of 10 days after rent falls due. IHCHS elected to 
exercise its rights under the Lease to terminate D&K's leasehold for failure to pay rent in 
a timely fashion. On April 14, 1998, IHCHS sent D&K a Notice of Default and 
Forfeiture of Lease Agreement pursuant to the terms of the Lease (a copy of which is 
annexed hereto as Ex. A). When D&K refused to vacate the premises, IHCHS initiated 
these proceedings, seeking to forfeit D&K's leasehold interest. 
SaltLake-159715.1 0033566-00014 
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In response to IHCHS' complaint, D&K counterclaimed seeking declaratory 
relief, arguing that (1) the Lease had been modified to eliminate the due date for each rent 
payment, and (2) IHCHS had waived its right to terminate, or should be estopped from 
terminating the Lease. After the pleadings closed, IHCHS filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule 12(c), Utah R. Civ. P., seeking an award of partial judgment on the pleadings, 
leaving for trial only the issue of monetary damages owing to IHCHS for D&K's 
unlawful holdover after IHCHS lawfully terminated the Lease. D&K filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment, asking the court to rule as a matter of law that it was 
entitled to the declaratory relief it sought. 
Evidence in the form of affidavits and deposition transcripts was filed both in 
support of and in opposition to D&K's cross-motion for summary judgment. Moreover, 
during the briefing process of these motions, D&K filed two separate motions for 
temporary restraining orders (the "TROs"), which motions were fully briefed, including 
the filing of supporting and opposing affidavits.1 
The trial court entertained oral argument on the TROs on March 22, 2001. On 
March 28, 2001, the trial court issued a ruling denying both TROs. D&K then filed a 
petition with this Court seeking an interlocutory appeal and a stay pending the decision 
on its petition for interlocutory appeal. On April 4, 2001 this Court denied D&K's 
motion for a stay pending the decision on its petition for interlocutory appeal. Then, on 
1
 The TROs sought to prevent IHCHS from removing a sign in front of the subject 
property and from dismantling the remainder of the stripmall which had surrounded The 
Southern Exposure. 
2 
April 19,2001, IHCHS stipulated with D&K for the withdrawal of D&K's petition for 
interlocutory appeal related to the unsuccessful TROs. 
Oral argument on the parties' cross-motions was held on April 13,2001, and on 
May 31,2001 the trial court filed its own Memorandum Decision granting IHCHS' 
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and impliedly denying D&K's cross-motion 
for summary judgment. 
B. D&K's Appeal and Summary of IHCHS5 Argument 
D&K's appeal, as summarized by the Appellant, is rooted in the argument that the 
trial court improperly relied upon the analysis in Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd v. 
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.. 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and Living 
Scriptures v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) to find that IHCHS had not waived 
its right to forfeit the Lease. Appellant claims that Olympus Hills and Living Scriptures 
improperly granted the trial court the freedom to consider the "totality of the 
circumstances" (App. Br. at 14) when determining whether an alleged acceptance of rent 
after a breach of lease constitutes a waiver, because according to D&K, Woodland 
Theaters, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theaters, Inc.. 560 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977), abridged 
that right and "held" that any acceptance of rent after any breach of lease constitutes a 
waiver of the remedy for the breach. 
As set forth below, D&K misapprehends the actions of the trial court and the 
relevant holdings at issue. Factually, IHCHS never accepted rent after it declared a 
default for D&K's failure to pay rent, nor did it ever knowingly accept rent at any time 
SaItLake-159715.1 0033566-00014 
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after D&K's breach. This undisputed fact (See Mem. Decision at 4, 6-7; R. 633, 635-36.) 
makes D&K's legal argument moot. 
Moreover, D&K misreads Woodland, Olympus Hills, and Living Scriptures in an 
attempt to create an appealable issue. Neither Olympus Hills nor Living Scriptures 
contradicts Woodland, and the trial court properly applied all three of those cases. These 
cases all stand for the proposition that if a landlord knowingly treats a lease as subsisting 
after learning of a tenant's breach, it cannot thereafter terminate the lease for that same 
breach. They all further recognize that it is not the acceptance of rent that determines if 
or when a waiver of the breach has occurred, but whether the landlord has intended to 
treat the lease as a subsisting contract notwithstanding the breach. Both Olympus Hills 
and Living Scriptures expressly found that waivers had not occurred merely because a 
rent check was cashed or, in the case of Living Scriptures, four checks were cashed, after 
the respective landlords claimed forfeiture of the leases. 
In brief, D&K's appeal must be denied and the trial court's ruling upheld as a 
matter of law because: 
1. It is undisputed that the pleadings state on their face a breach of lease by 
D&K which according to the Lease, provides IHCHS with the right to terminate the 
Lease; and 
2. D&K's defenses of waiver and estoppel fail both factually and legally. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the existing award of partial judgment on 
the pleadings. 
4 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Appellant's Statement of Facts Is Erroneous 
Appellant provides a lengthy statement of facts at pp. 4-13 of its brief. 
Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts is set forth in general prosaic form, without 
numbered paragraphs, making direct challenges to the claims difficult. Many of the 
assertions posited by D&K are, perhaps needless to say, disputed by IHCHS. Indeed, 
some of the facts set forth by Appellant for this Court contradict the factual findings of 
the trial court. For example, D&K asserts as a "fact" that IHCHS "accepted" D&K's 
April 1998 rent check even though March 1998 rent had not been paid. (Appellant Br. at 
7-8.) However, in its Statement of Facts, the trial court expressly found from the 
affidavits and deposition testimony presented to it that D&K's April rent was tendered 
"incorrectly." (Mem. Decision at 2; R. 631.) Thus, that rent had not been knowingly 
accepted. Because IHCHS was granted partial judgment on the pleadings, IHCHS 
contends that the facts which this Court should base its review upon are those set forth in 
the pleadings. Nevertheless, to clarify the record, IHCHS will respond to certain facts 
claimed by Appellant that IHCHS contends were not established below. 
1. Facts Disputed by IHCHS 
Lease Term. D&K claims as a fact that the Lease provided it with three separate 
five-year renewal options. (App. Br. at 5.) This "fact" is actually part of the case still 
pending at the trial court and is not resolved by the partial judgment awarded to IHCHS. 
IHCHS has always contended that the Lease allowed D&K only one five-year extension, 
not three, and this "fact," while not particularly germane to the issue now before this 
5 
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Court, is the subject of pending litigation at the trial court level. D&K's motive for 
claiming this "fact" is obviously an attempt to gain sympathy by claiming that many 
years of its Lease term are being forfeited. It is IHCHS' position that the term of the 
Lease would have expired in any event in 2004. 
History of Late Rental Payments. D&K describes a general history of being 
allowed to make late payments, without penalty, over a period of several years while a 
tenant at the subject property. D&K's description is not necessarily false, just patently 
misleading to this Court. It is true that D&K paid rent late without having its Lease 
forfeited in the past. However, there are two important facts that D&K omits, but that 
were of great relevance to the trial court: 
1. Although D&K's Lease was not terminated for prior late payments, other 
default options under the Lease were exercised by the landlord. Several Notices To Pay 
or Quit were served, late charges and penalties were assessed and the like. (E.g., R. at 
292, % 2.) It is undisputed that the Lease grants several options to the landlord in case of 
late payment. (See § 17 of Lease, attached as Ex. A to Brief of Appellant.) In short, 
although the option of forfeiting the Lease had not been previously exercised, other 
default options had been exercised, and therefore, D&K's attempt to describe a scenario 
in which it had free rein to pay rent whenever it desired, if at all, is patently false. (E.g., 
R. at 292; Aff. of Rideout.) 
2. D&K's assertion also ignores that when IHCHS acquired the property from 
the prior landlord in January 1998, it sent a letter to D&K informing D&K that IHCHS 
was the new property owner and that it expected rent to be paid on time and to the 
6 
property managers. (R. at 292; see also IHCHS letter, attached as Ex. D of Appellant's 
Brief.) Therefore, even if the prior landlord had allowed late payments, which both the 
prior landlord and IHCHS dispute (E.g., R. at 292,293.), D&K was on notice that the 
new property owner, IHCHS, expected timely rent payments. 
April Rent. D&K also mysteriously claims to have paid April 1998 rent in a 
timely manner. As the trial court found, D&K failed to tender April rent to the property 
managers as directed and instead gave the check directly to an unknowing Intermountain 
Health Care ("IHC") employee, who merely cashed the check in due course, without 
knowledge of these proceedings or IHCHS' desire to terminate the Lease. For this 
reason, IHCHS' Notice of Default referenced two months of missed rent (Le., March and 
April 1998). It is true that IHC cashed a check from D&K that D&K designated as 
"April rent." However, D&K breached the instructions for paying rent by side-stepping 
the property managers, and accordingly, IHCHS as landlord did not knowingly "accept" 
that rental payment. Moreover, because March 1998 rent still had not been paid, IHCHS' 
Notice of Default still advised D&K of a subsisting breach for which IHCHS had the 
right to exercise any of its contractually reserved options. 
B, Relevant Facts for This Court to Consider 
As indicated above, IHCHS contends that because IHCHS was awarded partial 
judgment on the pleadings, the only facts that should be considered are those set forth as 
undisputed in the pleadings: 
1. In January 1998, IHCHS purchased a strip mall at 52nd South State Street, 
Murray, Utah from Medical Plaza 9400. (Answer 1 7; R. at 39.) 
7 
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2. Before that purchase, D&K leased space in the mall (specifically, 5142 South 
State Street) from Medical Plaza 9400, under a written lease agreement dated July 18, 1994 
(the previously identified Lease). (Answer S 5; R. at 39.) A true copy of the Lease is annexed 
hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. When IHCHS purchased the mall, it accepted an assignment of Medical Plaza 
9400's interest in the Lease. (Answer t 7; R. at 39.) 
4. With the assignment of the Lease, D&K became IHCHS' tenant. Pursuant to 
section 3 of the Lease, D&K was obligated to pay IHCHS $3,280 per month in rent. (Answer 
11 7, 8; R. at 39, 40.) 
5. According to Section 3 of the Lease, this rent was due "in advance of the first 
day of each calendar month . . . ." (Answer 1 8; R. at 40.) 
6. Section 17.1 of the Lease provides, in pertinent part: 
Default by Tenant. Upon the occurrence of any of the 
following events, Landlord shall have the remedies set forth 
in Section 17.2: 
[a] Tenant fails to pay any other sum due hereunder within (10) days 
after the same / shall be due. 
7. Section 17.2, in turn, provides, in pertinent part: 
Remedies. Upon the occurrence of the events set forth in 
Section 17.1, Landlord shall have the option to take any or all 
of the following actions, without further notice or demand of 
any kind to Tenant or any other person: 
[c] Termination of this lease by written notice to Tenant 
(Answer t 14; R. at 18-19.) 
8 
8. After IHCHS took ownership of the property leased to D&K, D&K timely paid 
rent for February 1998. (Answer 19; R. at 40.) 
9. D&K did not make any rent payment for March 1998, during March 1998. 
(Answer f 10; R. at 40.) 
10. On April 14, 1998, IHCHS gave D&K written notice that it was terminating the 
Lease.2 (Answer H16; R. at 42.) (A copy of the "Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease 
Agreement," is attached as Ex. A hereto.) 
11. On or about March 1, 1999, D&K and IHCHS entered into a Consent, 
Reservation of Rights and Escrow Deposit Agreement whereby D&K could tender what it 
claimed to be additional accruing rents and IHCHS could reject such payments without waiving 
any of its rights. (R. at 157-162.)3 
2
 At the time the letter was sent, IHCHS did not know that D&K had allegedly 
attempted to pay rent for April 1998. The Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease 
Agreement made reference to such failure. IHCHS subsequently discovered that D&K 
had delivered a check to IHC's corporate offices (rather than to the property managers) 
and had designated the check as "April rent." However, it is still an undisputed fact that 
as of April 15, 1998, D&K had failed to pay March, 1998 rent. Additionally, when D&K 
ultimately tendered March, 1998 rent on April 16, 1998, that check, like all subsequent 
rental payments, was rejected. Since that time, IHCHS has placed all of D&K's tendered 
rents in escrow, according to an agreement that IHCHS "does not waive its claim of 
default and/or forfeiture of the Lease Agreement by allowing D&K Management to 
continue to occupy the Leased Premises . . . . " (Answer, % 20.) In short, it is an 
undisputed fact that no rent payments were accepted by IHCHS after it delivered the 
Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement to D&K. 
Specifically, paragraph 4 of that document provides that 
[T]he parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this 
Escrow Agreement, IHCHS does not waive its claims of 
default and/or forfeiture of the Lease Agreement against 
D&K Management by allowing D&K Management to 
continue to occupy the Leased Premises or to make any one 
9 
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C. The Court Can Grant IHCHS' Motion Despite Disputed Facts 
While there are numerous disputed facts that would normally require a trial, this 
Court is able to uphold the trial court's award of partial judgment on the pleadings. D&K 
admitted on the pleadings and confirmed by affidavit all of the facts necessary to 
establish IHCHS' breach of lease claim. D&K's affirmative defenses of waiver and 
estoppel fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court granted IHCHS' motion for 
partial judgment on the pleadings notwithstanding the disputed facts. In contrast, D&K 
attempted to convince this Court that it was entitled to summary judgment on various 
theories that the Lease had been modified. Numerous facts were disputed in that context. 
But, because D&K's claims were improper as a matter of law, those disputed facts did 
not prevent the trial court from granting IHCHS' motion for partial judgment on the 
pleadings and should not prohibit this Court from upholding that award. 4 
or all of the Escrow Deposits, and all of IHCHS' claims and 
assertions against D&K Management, including without 
limitation those set forth in the Default Letter, and against any 
defenses of D&K Management, whether articulated before or 
after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly 
reserved and not waived by reason of this Escrow Agreement 
and shall not in any way be lessened or diminished by reason 
of or in connection with the execution and delivery of this 
Escrow Agreement. 
4
 Significantly, D&K has asked this Court to enter summary judgment in D&K's 
favor rather than remand for trial (App. Br. at 40.) Therefore, it must necessarily be 
D&K's position that the issues presented can be adjudicated as a matter of law despite 
any disputed facts. 
10 
V. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As set forth in the Statement of the Case, IHCHS never brought a motion for 
summary judgment in this matter. Nevertheless, D&K's description of the issues to be 
determined by this appeal include assertions that the trial court erred by granting IHCHS 
summary judgment despite material disputed facts. Moreover, many of the issues 
presented by D&K for resolution assume legal and factual conclusions that the trial court 
did not share with D&K. For instance, D&K's first stated issue on appeal is whether 
IHCHS waived its right to forfeit the Lease based upon D&K's failure to pay March 1998 
rent after IHCHS accepted D&K's April 1998 rent. (Appellant Br. at 1.) However, as set 
forth above, the trial court found that IHCHS never intentionally or knowingly accepted 
April 1998 rent because it was not tendered in accordance with the parties' contract. 
(Mem. Decision at 2; R. at 631.) Simply stated, many of the issues D&K have put before 
this Court assume facts not in the record. 
Furthermore, IHCHS contends that the legal standard for review that D&K has 
posited is only partially correct. D&K refers to several cases for the proposition that this 
Court will review an award of summary judgment for correctness. Again, IHCHS has not 
sought summary judgment, but IHCHS agrees that the trial court's legal conclusions as to 
whether judgment on the pleadings was appropriate is reviewed for correctness. See e.g., 
Mountain America Credit Union v. McLellan. 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(cert, denied, 1993). 
11 
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However, one of the issues raised in D&K's cross-motion for summary judgment 
was waiver. Waiver by its nature is a mixed question of fact and law. This Court has 
expressly held that appellate courts should grant broad discretion to trial courts in 
determining whether a waiver has occurred in any particular case. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 933 (Utah 1994); see also Living Scriptures. 890 P.2d at 7,10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (same). Accordingly, this Court should review for correctness the trial court's 
determination that the pleadings establish a breach of lease giving rise to the termination 
of the Lease. However, it should defer to the trial court's determination that IHCHS had 
not waived that right unless this Court finds that the trial court abused its powers of 
review.5 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Properly Concluded that IHCHS' Right To Terminate 
the Lease Should Be Enforced as a Matter of Law Based upon the Pleadings 
The law will enforce a lease agreement providing for termination of the lease 
when a tenant fails to pay rent on time. See, e^., Woodland, 560 F.2d 700; Davidsohn v. 
Doyle, 825 P.2d 1227 (Nev. 1992); Welch v. Kiser. 668 So. 2d 9 (Ala. 1994); Holt v. 
5
 IHCHS'motion was granted as a matter of law. However, because D&K filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment that went beyond the pleadings and then filed two 
separate motions for temporary restraining orders, at the time the trial court issued its 
ruling it had received and reviewed over a half-dozen affidavits and numerous deposition 
transcripts. Therefore, the trial court was well positioned to determine any factual issues 
as they related to D&K's claims of waiver or estoppel. The trial court's Memorandum 
Decision indicts that it was granting IHCHS' motion for partial judgment on the 
pleadings and summary judgment. IHCHS contends that to the extent the trial court's 
extensive review of affidavits and deposition transcript converted IHCHS motion to one 
for summary judgment, the trial court intentionally found that either award was proper in 
these circumstances. 
12 
Warren, 176 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1949). In this case, the Lease required the tenant to pay 
rent in advance on the first day of each month. The Lease also imposed a penalty if rent 
was not paid within 10 days of the due date. It is an undisputed fact that the first time 
D&K tendered March 1998 rent was on April 16, 1998. Under no circumstances could 
this tender be characterized as timely. It is further undisputed and was specifically found 
by the trial court that IHCHS rejected that belated tender of March 1998 rent. (Mem. 
Decision at 2.) Accordingly, IHCHS had the legal right to exercise any of the options the 
Lease provided to the landlord for the tenant's failure to pay rent. One option given to 
the landlord upon the tenant's failure to pay rent on time or within the grace period is the 
right to terminate the Lease. Because IHCHS acted in accordance with the Lease, the 
trial court properly awarded IHCHS partial judgment on the pleadings, finding that 
IHCHS could forfeit the Lease. 
1. Plaintiff Never Waived the Right To Terminate the 
Lease 
D&K's main argument before the trial court and again on appeal is that IHCHS 
waived its right to terminate the Lease. This argument is founded upon the claim that 
IHCHS cashed the check D&K had marked "April rent" even though it was forfeiting the 
Lease for D&K's failure to pay March 1998 rent. As discussed in the Statement of Facts, 
it is true that IHCHS cashed a check described by D&K as "April rent" on April 8, 1998 
because D&K took that check directly to a corporate employee of IHC rather than to 
IHCHS' property managers as instructed. Accordingly, IHC unknowingly cashed that 
check in due course without knowledge of IHCHS' intention to terminate the Lease. 
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Still, the critical undisputed fact is that D&K had never paid its March 1998 rent, and 
therefore was not current on its rent on April 14, 1998 when IHCHS sent D&K the 
Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement.6 It is further undisputed that the 
first time D&K tendered March 1998 rent was on April 16, 1998, which was after IHCHS 
had elected to terminate the Lease. 
IHCHS' conduct, as a matter of law, does not amount to a waiver. The Utah 
Supreme Court has explained that a waiver of the right to terminate a lease for a breach 
occurs when a landlord knowingly treats the lease as a subsisting contract after he or she 
learns of the breach justifying termination through acceptance of rent. See, e.g.. 
Woodland, 560 P2d. at 700. In contrast, D&K reads Woodland to stand for the 
proposition that any rent check cashed after a breach of lease occurs forever waives the 
landlord's right to elect remedies for the breach, irrespective of the landlord's knowledge 
or intent. A brief analysis of Woodland clarifies the basis for its holding. 
Woodland Theatres, Inc. leased a drive-in movie theater to ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc. Woodland sued ABC to terminate its lease, alleging that before July 1974, 
ABC had failed in its obligation "to improve and maintain the premises and equipment in 
a good state of repair; [and] to operate the theater in a prudent, diligent, and businesslike 
6
 Significantly, IHCHS sent the Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease 
Agreement after the "April rent" check was cashed. At the time the Notice of Default 
and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement was sent, it is undisputed that D&K had failed to pay 
rent on its due date or within the 10-day grace period. Even if the "April rent" check was 
applied to March rent, April rent was then beyond the grace period. Conversely, if the 
"April rent" check was applied to April rent, the March rent was beyond the grace period. 
Under any interpretation of the events, at the time IHCHS elected its contractual remedy 
to default and forfeit D&K, D&K was in breach of the Lease. 
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manner " Id. at 701. For a time, Woodland refused to accept rent from ABC. In 
December 1974, however, Woodland accepted all rents it had previously rejected. 
Subsequently, while the lawsuit was pending, Woodland accepted regular rental 
payments. The court noted that, at the time of judgment, ABC was completely current on 
its rent. In this factual scenario, Justice Maughn recognized that a "landlord seeking 
enforcement of a forfeiture must take care not to do anything which may be deemed an 
acknowledgment of a continuation of the tenancy. Any act done by a landlord knowing 
of a cause for forfeiture by his tenant, affirming the existence of the lease and recognizing 
the lessee as his tenant, is a waiver of such forfeiture." Id. at 702. (quoting 3 A Thompson 
on Real Property (1959 replacement), at 576). 
Although Woodland stated in discovery responses that it did not "in any respect 
admit that said acceptance constitutes a waiver of any claims for breach of the subject 
lease," the court determined that such "unilateral reservation avails lessor nothing" and 
that "the acceptance of [the] rental payments after the action was filed precludes its right 
to enforce forfeiture." Id. (emphasis added). 
In contrast, IHCHS never accepted rent after it sent out its Notice of Default and 
Forfeiture of Lease Agreement. On April 16, 1998, having been in default for more than 
a month, and having received the Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement, 
D&K first tendered a check for March rent. The very next day, April 17, 1998, IHCHS 
n 
Apparently it was Woodland's position that, by accepting rent, it was somehow 
recovering its damages. 
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returned the check, rejecting the tender. IHCHS has not cashed a rent check since 
delivering its Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement. 
Because IHCHS never attempted to collect rent or otherwise treat the Lease as a 
subsisting contract after it delivered the Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease 
Agreement, under Woodland, IHCHS did not waive its ability to terminate the Lease. 
See also Welch, 668 So. 2d at 9 (right to forfeit lease not waived though rent prepaid for 
two months after event of default giving rise to right to forfeit; rent accepted before 
sending notice of forfeiture cannot constitute waiver); Davidsohn, 825 P.2d 1227 (in 
commercial lease only affirmative action by landlord to acknowledge ongoing lease after 
notice of termination waives right to terminate; technical waiver cannot occur in face of 
affirmative steps to enforce termination). 
2. D&K's Arguments on The Waiver of Law Are Too 
Simplistic 
D&K argues in essence that IHCHS waived its right to enforce the Lease by 
negligently and unknowingly reaffirming the existence of the Lease after D&K's breach. 
(D&K Mem. at 11-14.) The law with respect to waiver as a general principle is well-
established. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's, Inc. 
v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme 
Court has made clear that in order to constitute a waiver, "there must be [1] an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, [2] a knowledge of its existence, and [3] an intention to 
relinquish it." Id.; see also Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at 72; Pasker, Gould, Ames & 
Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case the 
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undisputed facts prove that IHCHS did not intend to relinquish its right to terminate the 
Lease after it learned of D&K's breach., and the trial court properly found as a matter of 
fact that once IHCHS elected its remedy of forfeiture, it never varied from its stated 
intention. (Mem. Decision at 4; R. at 633.) 
3. D&K's Arguments on Facts Constituting Waiver 
Are Equally Flawed 
To support it claim of waiver, D&K asserts that IHCHS reaffirmed the Lease by 
(1) accepting April's rent after the March breach; (2) accepting March's rent on April 16, 
1998; (3) demanding an increase in the rent in June 1998; (4) demanding proof of 
insurance on January 21, 1999; (5) sending invoices to D&K for the increased rent 
amount; and (6) receiving checks mailed by D&K for rent though not cashing them. 
D&K's argument ignores the critical undisputed facts of this dispute contort the law of 
waiver, and seek to place an impossible burden upon landlords dealing with holdover 
tenants who unlawfully refuse to vacate rented premises despite breaching a lease 
agreement. 
IHCHS will deal with each alleged act constituting a waiver below to demonstrate 
that D&K's arguments are without merit. 
Accepting April's Rent After the March Breach. D&K argues that IHCHS 
waived the right to terminate the Lease by accepting April's rent on April 3, 1998, after 
the March breach. D&K's argument ignores that IHCHS did not terminate the lease until 
after it had unknowingly accepted April's rent and terminated the Lease based upon 
D&K's failure to pay March's rent. (R. at 611; Mem. Decision at 2; R. at 292-93 (Aff. of 
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D. Rideout.)) Cashing the April rent check did not constitute a knowing waiver. Rather 
than being delivered to the Daniel Rideout ("Rideout") pursuant to IHCHS' instructions, 
the April rent was sent directly to IHC's corporate office. (R. at 292-93.) Because D&K 
failed to deliver the payment as instructed, IHC, which manages numerous properties, 
inadvertently cashed the check. (R. at 279; Uriona Aff.) Such inadvertent action cannot 
constitute a waiver. See Werner v. Baker. 693 P.2d 385, 387 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) 
(recognizing that acceptance of rent must be "knowing"); Jefpaul Garage Corp. v. 
Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York, 462 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (same); 
Rhodes v. United States, 310 A.2d 250, 251 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting defendant's 
claim of waiver when landlord did not intend to waive claim even when landlord 
accepted rent paid after notice of termination); see also Schottenstein Trustees v. Carano, 
2000 WL 1455425 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that acceptance of check must be 
knowing to constitute waiver). Because the trial court found as a matter of fact that the 
April check was improperly tendered to IHC in light of IHCHS' instructions to its tenant, 
the inadvertent cashing of that check was not a waiver as a matter of law. (R. at 611; 
Mem. Decision at 2.) 
Additionally, it is important to note that acceptance of the April rent was before 
IHCHS' notice of intent to terminate. In Woodland, the Utah Supreme Court made clear 
that it was the acceptance of rent "after the action was filed" that precluded the landlord's 
right to terminate. 560 P.2d at 702 (emphasis added). Because the inadvertent cashing of 
the April check happened before IHCHS' notice of termination, it could not constitute an 
affirmation of the contract subsequent to the termination. Finally, even if inadvertently 
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accepting this one check constituted acceptance of rent, accepting a single rent payment 
after termination does not by itself, constitute a waiver. See Living Scriptures, 890 P.2d 
at 7, 9-10 (holding that landlord's acceptance of late payments four times did not 
o 
constitute waiver because it was not routine). 
Accepting March's Rent on April 16,1998. D&K argues that the trial court 
"erroneously refused to conclude that IHCHS accepted D&K's tender of March rent." 
(App. Br. at 30.) Indeed, as the trial court found, IHCHS never accepted March's rent. 
Although D&K delivered a check for March rent, after being advised of the termination, 
to IHCHS' property manager's elderly mother, IHCHS immediately returned the check 
without cashing it. (Complaint f^ 10; Answer f 10; Appeal Br. % 30.) Returning tendered 
payments without cashing them cannot reasonably be considered accepting payment. See 
Black's Law Dictionary (5 ed 1979) (defining accepting as "[t]o receive with approval or 
satisfaction; to receive with intent to retain"); see also Corcoran Management Co., Inc. v. 
Withers, 513 N.E. 2d 218, 223 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (holding but not cashing rent check 
does not amount to acceptance of rent); Cipolla v. McCloskev, 1998 WL 852810 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998) (same); Burns v. Wallace, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 99,101 (Ny. 1948 (same); Pillot 
v. Moss, 53 N.E. 2d 73, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) (same); Rhodes, 310 A.2d at 251 
This holding is not in disaccord with Woodland. In Woodland, the Landlord 
accepted five months of rental payments after previously rejecting those same payments 
and thus confirmed ABC Theaters' tenancy. 560 P.2d at 702. Such conduct did not 
occur in Living Scriptures, nor has it occurred in this case. Even if D&K's allegations 
are correct, IHCHS inadvertently accepted only one rental payment before its notice of 




(defining acceptance as receipt with intent to retain). Additionally, even if receiving the 
check for one day constituted acceptance, it was not knowing. Ms. Rideout, an elderly 
woman in her late 80s at the time, did not know that IHCHS had terminated the Lease 
and did not knowingly accept the payment with the intent to waive IHCHS' right to 
terminate the lease, nor was she authorized by the property managers to accept the check. 
(R. at 292-93.) 
Demanding an Increase in Rent in June 1998; Demanding Proof of Insurance 
on January 21,1999; Sending Invoices to D&K For Increased Rent Amount; 
Receiving Checks Mailed By D&K for Rent. The remaining actions that D&K asserts 
constitute a waiver of the right to terminate were taken after notice of termination and 
more importantly after D&K refused to vacate the premises. However, none of the 
actions constitute a waiver of D&K's breach because in none of these instances did 
IHCHS recognize D&K as a tenant under a subsisting lease. Indeed, the most important 
fact of this case in that regard is that IHCHS has not accepted a single payment from 
D&K since IHCHS gave notice of termination. (R. at 279; Uriona Aff.) 
D&K's suggestion that IHCHS has repeatedly recognized D&K as a tenant in the 
face of IHCHS' uniform refusal to accept rent is nearly absurd. No landlord refuses rent 
from an entity it recognizes as its tenant. Since April 14, 1998, IHCHS has consistently 
maintained that the Lease was terminated and D&K was unlawfully in possession of the 
premises. Id. at 9-11. However, D&K refused to vacate the premises. In light of D&K's 
refusal to vacate, IHCHS was forced to take actions to protect its rights and its property. 
Id. If IHCHS prevails, it is entitled to damages for D&K's unlawful detainer. Those 
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damages include the reasonable rental value of the premises. See Pingree v. The 
Continental Group of Utah, 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). Conversely, if D&K prevails, 
IHCHS is entitled to accrued rental payments under the Lease. Accordingly, regardless 
of the outcome, IHCHS is entitled to recovery from D&K. Consequently, IHCHS 
proposed and began negotiations to prepare an escrow agreement whereby D&K would 
put the rental amounts into escrow pending resolution of this dispute. (R. at 157-62.) 
Such action cannot constitute a waiver. Certainly, IHCHS did not intend for these actions 
to relinquish its right to terminate. Indeed, the escrow agreement provides that "IHCHS 
does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease Agreement against 
D&K Management by allowing D&K Management to continue to occupy the Lease 
Premises or to make any one or all of the Escrow Deposits" (emphasis added). 
Likewise, D&K's continued possession of the premises risks substantial damage 
to the property. It is not unreasonable for a property owner to require a holdover tenant 
who remains in possession after default to demonstrate adequate insurance. D&K's 
argument would require landlords to risk destruction of the premises in order to terminate 
a lease whenever the tenant has refused to vacate. That argument was properly rejected 
by the trial court. Ultimately, D&K's argument fails because since April 14, 1998, 
IHCHS has repeatedly told D&K that the Lease was terminated and it was only taking the 
actions set forth above to protect itself in light of D&K's unlawful detainer. 
Woodland, does not require a different result. In Woodland, the landlord accepted 
five months of rent after initially rejecting those rental payments. 569 P.2d at 702. The 
court noticed that, at the time of judgment, ABC was completely current on its rent. Id. 
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In this factual scenario, the court recognized that "[a] landlord seeking enforcement of a 
forfeiture must take care not to do anything which may be deemed an acknowledgment of 
a continuation of the tenancy." Id. at 702. Conversely, in this case, IHCHS has 
continuously maintained and repeatedly told D&K that the Lease was terminated and 
D&K was obligated to vacate the premises. Since April 1998, IHCHS has never taken a 
different position and D&K's claim of waiver is simply unsupported by the facts. 
Accordingly, IHCHS has not knowingly relinquished its right to terminate the lease based 
upon D&K's breach. See Living Scriptures, 890 P.2d at 9-10; Welch, 668 So. 2d 9; 
Davidsohn. 825 P.2d 1227.9 
4. The Trial Court Properly Found No Waiver to 
Have Occurred. 
All reported decisions in this jurisdiction discussing an allegation that a landlord 
waived its right to enforce a lease by post breach actions support the trial court's ruling. 
The trial court cited with approval the Nevada case of Davidson v. Doyle, 825 
P.2d 1227 (Nev. 1992) for the proposition that IHCHS should be allowed to take steps to 
protect its property (such as demanding insurance) during the course of litigation after 
D&K indicated it would not vacate the premises. The trial court found the analysis in 
Davidson, together with that in Living Scripture and Olympus Hills demonstrated that 
IHCHS should not be found to have waived its right to terminate the Lease simply 
because it took reasonable steps to protect itself after D&K refused to honor the Notice of 
Default. D&K argues that Davidson is inconsistent with Woodland, and hence the trial 
court's reliance thereon is error. However, the point the trial court found persuasive in 
Davidson is in no way inconsistent with Woodland. Moreover, the trial court relied on 
Living Scripture and Olympus Hills for the same propositions. 
Finally, a close reading of Davidson reveals that the court therein was noting that 
Woodland found a waiver for post-breach acceptance of checks while other jurisdictions 
have not found such conduct a waiver. Yet the proposition Davidson was cited for (i.e. 
reasonable steps taken to protect property after tenant refuses to vacate do not constitute 
waiver) has nothing to do with the rent payment analysis. D&K's protestations about the 
trial court's reference to Davidson are meritless. 
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For instance, in Olvmpus Hills, 889 P.2d 445,461, the Utah Court of Appeals did hold 
that in some circumstances acceptance of rent after a breach of lease may constitute a 
waiver of the breach. However, the case clarified that where there is clear and 
undisputed evidence that the landlord had taken a definite course of action to terminate 
the lease, the mere acceptance of rent does not constitute a waiver, because as a matter of 
law, a waiver must be an intentional act. 
The facts do not show that Olympus Hills intended to waive 
its right to claim default under the lease. Rather, they show a 
definite course by Olympus Hills to terminate the lease. We 
acknowledge that acceptance of rental payments may 
constitute a waiver of a claim of breach. Givard v. Appleby, 
660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Woodland Theaters. Inc. v. 
ABC Intermountain Theaters, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 
1977). However, this is just one fact to consider in 
determining whether there was a waiver. 
Id 
Similarly in Living Scriptures, 890 P.2d 7, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court's ruling that Living Scripture's acceptance of late rent for four months did not 
waive its right to thereafter demand timely rent and evict Kudlik for failing to pay timely 
rent. Id. at 11. The Living Scriptures opinion also emphasizes the discretion given to 
trial courts to determine whether a waiver has occurred. Id. at 10. 
In this instance the trial court concluded that based upon the undisputed facts as 
contained in the pleadings, IHCHS had taken sufficient express and determined steps to 
terminate the Lease such that the details complained of by D&K could not amount to an 
intentional waiver of its expressed intention to terminate the Lease. That ruling by the 
trial court was consistent with Utah law and should be upheld. 
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5. D&K's Attempt To Distinguish Olympus Hills and 
Living Scriptures Is Flawed and Disingenuous 
Appellant's brief dwells repeatedly on the argument that "Living Scriptures and 
Olympus Hills . . . are both easily distinguishable on their facts from the present 
situation," (App. Br. at 21.) and that the trial court erred when it relied on those cases to 
award IHCHS partial judgment. Curiously, it was D&K that directed the trial court to 
those cases. 
In Appellant's opposition to plaintiffs motion for partial judgment on the 
pleadings and memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
D&K instructed the trial court that the elements of waiver as recognized by Utah law 
were expressed in Living Scriptures. (Id. at 19 n.8; R. 112.) ("The elements of waiver 
consist of . . . " (citing Living Scriptures). Having instructed the trial court that it should 
apply the rules of waiver as articulated in Living Scriptures it is inappropriate for D&K to 
now argue on appeal that the trial court erred by applying Living Scriptures' analysis 
under these facts. Importantly, D&K does not argue that the trial court misread Living 
Scriptures; rather, it argues that Living Scriptures is an aberration from the "purer" 
doctrine of waiver found in Woodland. D&K's arguments are not only disingenuous, but 
misapprehend Living Scriptures, Olympus Hills and Woodland as well. All of these 
cases recognize that a landlord can waive a contractual remedy, and all cases looked at 
the intent of the landlord to determine whether it had meant to treat the lease as ongoing 
when the complained of events occurred. Appropriately, the trial court relied upon 
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Woodland, Olympus Hills and Living Scriptures when it ruled that no waiver had been 
intended by IHCHS. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Erroneously Ignore D&K's Estoppel 
Arguments 
Beyond claiming that IHCHS' conduct waived its right to terminate the Lease, 
D&K argued that the same conduct should estop IHCHS from terminating the Lease. 
D&K made this argument at the trial court level and now claims as reversible error that 
the trial court ignored these arguments. It is true that the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision did not use the term "estoppel" in granting IHCHS' motion and denying 
D&K's. However, the facts D&K claimed constituted an estoppel were the same facts 
D&K claimed constituted a waiver. D&K's entire estoppel argument is merely a second 
shot at the same target. D&K instructed the trial court in its memoranda that its argument 
of waiver and estoppel were essentially identical. (See, e.g., D&K Mem. in Supp. of 
Summ. J. at 19 n.8; R. 112.) ("same result [of estoppel] if this Court applied the closely-
related doctrine of waiver"). 
Additionally, the trial court did address in its Memorandum Decision issues that 
would preclude D&K's estoppel claim. For instance, the trial court recognized that 
IHCHS' January 1998 letter to D&K advising it that it had a new landlord put D&K on 
notice of how and where it needed to pay rent from that time forward. (Letter is Ex. D of 
Appeal Br.) This fact would alone defeat D&K's claim that its prior history with the 
Rideout landlords should estop IHCHS from strictly enforcing the Lease. 
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Most importantly, however, the estoppel arguments D&K made to the trial court 
were legally flawed, even assuming all factual allegations made by D&K were true. As 
set forth below, IHCHS, as a matter of law, would not be estopped from enforcing the 
Lease. 
1. IHCHS Should Not Be Estopped From Enforcing 
Payment Deadlines 
D&K argues that IHCHS is estopped from enforcing the payment deadlines set 
forth in the Lease. (D&K Mem. at 15-19.) D&K's argument fails as a matter of law. A 
party alleging equitable estoppel bears the burden of proving three elements: (1) 
representation; (2) reliance; and (3) detriment. Weise v. Weise. 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 
1985). In this case, IHCHS made no representation and D&K did not reasonably rely. 
To support its claim of estoppel, D&K asserts that IHCHS misled D&K into 
believing that it could make its payments whenever it was convenient and that it relied 
upon that belief in failing to make the March payment on time. Both arguments are 
factually and legally incorrect. 
2. fflC Did Not Represent That D&K Could Make 
Payments Untimely 
To support its claim of estoppel, D&K must prove that IHCHS made a false 
representation. See Weise, 699 P.2d at 702. In the absence of promissory estoppel, 
estoppel must be based upon a representation concerning a past or present fact and not a 
mere promise or statement of the future. Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 
P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). Additionally, the alleged promise must be reasonably 
certain and not based upon the claimant's subjective understanding. Id. at 1089. In an 
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attempt to fulfill that burden, D&K argues that IHCHS misled D&K by (1) the Rideout's 
long-standing pattern of accepting late rent and (2) IHCHS' acceptance of February's rent 
late. D&K's argument fails as a matter of law. 
D&K argues that the Rideout accepted late payments from D&K for years and 
therefore misled D&K into believing that it could make payments late. Initially, it is 
undisputed that D&K was never explicitly told that it could make payments untimely 
without risk of forfeiture. (R. at 272; Rideout Affidavit ^ 6; see also Bangerter Affidavit 
at 28-29.) Instead, D&K relies upon its subjective belief from its alleged history of poor 
performance. Such subjective belief cannot be the basis for estoppel. Nunley, 989 P.2d 
at 1088. Moreover, there was no such agreement between the parties. Mr. Rideout 
explained in his affidavit that there was never an explicit or implicit agreement that D&K 
could pay rent untimely. (R. at 292-93; Rideout Aff. f 2, 6.) In fact, when D&K failed to 
make timely payment, the Rideouts immediately demanded payment. Id. f^ 2. On several 
occasions, the Rideouts sent formal notices to pay or quit to D&K requiring them to pay 
the rent within three day or to vacate the premises. Id. Indeed, on at least one occasion, 
the Rideouts threatened to terminate the Lease. Id. at Ex. A thereto. Additionally, 
Rideout often imposed late fees for failure to make timely payment. Id., see also 
(Bangerter Dep. at 29-30.) The notice to pay or quit and the late fees clearly refute 
D&K's alleged modification allowing it to pay the rent when it was convenient.10 
Even if D&K's argument was factually correct, these representations were 
made at a time when the Rideouts were not agents for IHCHS and therefore cannot form 
the basis of an estoppel claim against IHCHS. 
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In essence, D&K's argument is that the landlord had never terminated the Lease 
previously and therefore IHCHS should not be allowed to do so in this case. That 
argument ignores the plain language of the Lease. The Lease provides for a variety of 
remedies upon default by D&K, including forcible reentry, suit for ejectment, termination 
of lease, and/or imposition of late fees. (Lease § 17.2.) The Lease specifically also 
allows the landlord to simply accept the payments late. Id. In addition to accepting late 
rent, however, the Lease provides that the Landlord may terminate the Lease. 
Additionally, the Lease provides that "Landlord shall have the option to take any or all of 
the following actions." Id Accordingly, even if in the past the landlord had chosen to 
exercise its option to collect late rent, that decision does not preclude the landlord from 
choosing to exercise a different remedy for a subsequent breach. Even if the Rideouts did 
not choose to terminate the Lease, that does not preclude IHCHS from exercising that 
option upon D&K's default, as it did in this case. 
Next, D&K argued that IHCHS represented that D&K could make untimely 
payments by accepting the February payment late. That argument ignores the facts and 
the law. Initially, whether the February payment was late is a disputed fact.11 
Additionally, even if IHCHS accepted payment late once, that hardly establishes the 
11
 D&K bases its claim on the fact that the bank stamp on the back of the check 
shows it was processed on February 24, 1999. However, the check is dated February 1, 
1999. Although it had been the Rideouts' practice to take checks to the bank when 
received, no one claims personal knowledge of when the February check was paid. It had 
always been IHCHS' understanding that the February 1, 1999 date on D&K's check was 
correct, notwithstanding D&K's current position that it apparently backdated the check to 
make it appear timely. For purposes of IHCHS' motion, D&K's answer admitted that it 
paid February 1998 in accordance with the "modified" Lease. 
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conduct necessary to constitute a representation upon which D&K could reasonably rely. 
See Living Scriptures, 890 P.2d at 9-10. Indeed, the cases cited by D&K to the trial court 
are distinguishable because in those cases the landlord and tenant had engaged in a course 
of dealing allowing the tenant to breach without any penalty for an extended period of 
time. See Gonsalves v. Gilbert, 356 P.2d 379, 352-53 (Haw. 1960); Stephens v. Alaska, 
501 P.2d 759, 761 (Alaska 1972) (requiring course of dealing); Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657, 663 (Idaho 1982) (repeatedly accepted rental payments late). 
Finally, in this case IHCHS not only did not agree that D&K could make its 
payments untimely, IHCHS specifically informed D&K that rent had to be paid timely. 
In the letter sent by IHCHS to D&K notifying D&K that IHCHS had purchased the 
premises, IHCHS stated that payments "will be collected by the Rideouts at the regularly 
scheduled time each month." (emphasis added.) This letter makes clear that the 
payments were to be made at the "scheduled time," which, according to the Lease, was 
on or before the first of each month. D&K's argument implies that this means that the 
payments could continue to be made late. However, that argument ignores the word 
"scheduled." D&K's alleged modification that it could make the payment when 
convenient is certainly not a "scheduled time." Accordingly, IHCHS' statement that 
payments must be made at the time scheduled in the Lease put D&K on notice that 
payments were to be made on or before the first of each month. 
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3. D&K Did Not Rely Upon EBCHS 
Even if IHCHS somehow represented that D&K could make rent payments 
untimely, (which it did not) D&K must prove that it relied upon IHCHS' representations. 
The undisputed facts of this case prove that D&K did not rely upon any representation by 
IHCHS when it failed to make the March payment. Indeed, Kent Bangerter 
("Bangerter"), D&K's person responsible for ensuring compliance with the Lease, 
testified that he believed March's rent had been paid timely. (Bangerter Dep. at 42.) 
Bangerter added that he did not find out the March rent was late until April 16, 1998, 
undoubtedly when he received the formal notice of termination. Id. Accordingly, it 
cannot be argued that D&K changed its actions in reliance upon any representation made 
by IHCHS. D&K was not intending to make its payment late in reliance on any promise 
made by IHCHS. Instead, D&K simply breached the agreement by its own negligence. 
That cannot form the basis of equitable estoppel. 
D&K also argued to the trial court that the Lease provision requiring rent to be 
paid by the first of each month had been modified by the course of conduct between the 
parties. This argument is legally unsupportable. The Utah Statute of Frauds mandates 
that all leases with a duration of one year or more be in writing. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-
3. "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year . . . shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party by whom the lease . . . is to be made" Id. Utah law is equally well settled that "if 
an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement which 
modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the statute 
of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that while a "course of 
dealing" may be considered in construing an ambiguous contract, it will not suffice to 
create an agreement "especially when the agreement must be in writing to satisfy the 
statute of frauds." Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542, 546 
(Utah 1987). Thus as a matter of law, a writing would be necessary between the parties 
to vary the rental due date specified in the Lease. Moreover, the course of conduct 
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4. The Trial Court Did Not Misunderstand The 
Facts. 
D&K finally seeks a reversal by claiming that the trial court misunderstood the 
facts and entered judgment on misperception. D&K makes this claim on the grounds 
that the trial court "found" that IHCHS returned the "April check" when actually 
IHCHS (unknowingly) cashed the check. 
Appellant is correct that IHCHS did unknowingly cash one of the two checks 
tendered in April. However, it denies that the trial court materially misunderstood the 
facts. The trial court did write that "IHC promptly returned the March and April 
checks to D&K" (Mem. Decision at 2; R. 631.) which is technically incorrect. But it 
had earlier noted that the "April rental payment was timely, but the method of tender 
was incorrect." IcL This latter statement is correct. Additionally, since the payment 
tendered by D&K for "March rent" was delivered in April, and IHCHS returned that 
check, a claim that the "April check" was returned is technically correct. In any event, 
the semantics are immaterial. The trial court's conclusion notes that judgment on the 
pleadings was granted because "D&K failed to pay its March 1998 rental payment." 
As such, D&K is in default, and IHC's Notice of Forfeiture is valid." (Mem. Decision 
between the parties could not be considered by the trial court as evidence of modification 
since course of conduct may only be examined to interpret an ambiguous written term. 
Here, the provision requiring rents to be paid in advance of the first of each month is 
unambiguous. 
D&K appears to have abandoned this argument on appeal. 
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at 6; R. 635.) That statement is undisputedly true. Therefore, the award of partial 
judgment was based upon a correct, undisputed, fact. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As IHCHS has attempted to demonstrate above, D&K's bases for appeal in this 
matter are without merit. In summary, the issues D&K has raised should be disposed of 
as follows: 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that IHCHS did not waive its 
right to forfeit the Lease, based upon D&K's failure to pay March 1998 rent on time, by 
accepting April 1998 rent and other benefits under the Lease after IHCHS had notice that 
D&K had missed the March payment? 
Answer: No. IHCHS did not knowingly accept April rent after it knew of 
D&K's default. This is proven, among other ways, by merely reading the Notice of 
Default which informs D&K that IHCHS had not received March or April rent when it 
declared the default. D&K side-stepped the designated property managers, thus causing 
IHCHS' parent company to unknowingly cash a check. Because, as a matter of law, a 
waiver must be an intentional act to relinquish a known right, the inadvertent cashing of 
rent by a parent company, in the face of numerous other acts of direct intent to terminate 
the Lease, cannot be a waiver. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in concluding that IHCHS did not accept the 
April 1998 rent but returned it to D&K? 
Answer: No. First, the trial court correctly stated its understanding that 
IHCHS had not knowingly accepted April rent because it was not delivered to the 
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property managers, and instead was taken to an unknowing corporate employee of 
IHCHS' parent company. Second, the trial court specified that its ruling was based solely 
upon D&K's failure to pay March 1988 which is an undisputed fact. This makes the 
April rent immaterial. 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err by concluding that there was no disputed issue 
of material fact regarding whether IHCHS' other actions constituted a waiver? 
Answer: No. Even assuming all of D&K's allegations to be true, the acts 
complained of (i.e., demanding the holdover tenant maintain insurance, etc.) do not 
manifest an intent to relinquish its right to terminate the Lease. Rather, steps were taken 
in conjunction with a stipulated reservation of rights to allow D&K to remain in the 
property during litigation, and to protect IHCHS' legitimate interest during that period. 
Issue 4: Did the trial court err by not concluding that there were material 
disputed facts surrounding whether Ms. Rideout irrevocably accepted March 1998 after 
Notice of Default? 
Answer: No. The undisputed facts show that the check was returned, 
uncashed, to D&K, and as a matter of law "acceptance" requires receipt with knowledge 
and an intent to retain. 
Issue 5: Did the trial court err by not addressing D&K's argument that its 
course of dealing with the prior landlord should estop IHCHS from enforcing the 
payment deadlines in the Lease? 
Answer: No. The trial court disposed of this argument factually by finding 
that when IHCHS took ownership of the property, it put D&K on notice that IHCHS 
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expected payments to be made on the scheduled date. Additionally, as a matter of law, 
estoppel does not lie because D&K stated that it negligently missed the March rent 
payment, it did not rely on any statement of IHCHS in not making the payment. Finally, 
the issue is duplicative of D&K's waiver argument which the trial court did address— 
IHCHS engaged in no conduct which would relinquish its right to forfeit the tenant, and 
hence, engaged in no conduct which would reasonably lead the tenant to believe it had 
relinquished that right. 
For the foregoing reasons, IHCHS asks this Court to uphold the trial court's 
ruling granting IHCHS an award of partial judgment on the pleadings. 
DATED this 3_ day of December, 2001. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
B^ Matthew Moscon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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April 14, 1998 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
D&K Management, Inc. 
5142 South State Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attention: Mr. Ken Bangerter 
Re: Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement 
Dear Mr. Bangerter: 
As you know, IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. ("IHCHS"), acquired the property 
subject to, and took an assignment of, that certain Lease Agreement, dated July 18,1994 (the 
"Lease"), relating to the premises at 5142 South State Street, Murray, Utah (the "Premises") (a 
copy of which is enclosed for your reference). As you also know, on or about January 26,1998, 
IHCHS notified D&K MANAGEMENT, INC. ("D&K") of the purchase and assignment1 and, at 
that time, instructed D&K that rents should be made to IHCHS and would be collected on behalf 
of IHCHS at the regularly scheduled time each month. A copy of the form of that letter is 
enclosed. 
Although rents were paid by D&K as scheduled for February 1998, and notwithstanding 
efforts by the Rideouts to collect rent on behalf of IHCHS (as indicated in the enclosed letter), no 
rent payments have been made by D&K for March or April 1998. As outlined in Paragraph 3.1 
of the Lease, D&K as Tenant is bound to pay to IHCHS a minimum monthly rental payment of 
$3,280.00 on the first calendar day of each month. D&K has failed to pay IHCHS rent as 
required, inasmuch as it has failed to make payments for March and April 1998. Pursuant to 
Paragraph 17.1 of the Lease, IHCHS has the option of invoking any of the remedies enumerated 
in the Lease if D&K "fails to pay any rental or any other sum due hereunder within ten [10] days 
after the same / shall be due." D&K's failure to timely pay rents to IHCHS represents a default 
under the terms of the Lease entitling IHCHS to the remedies identified in Section 17.2 of the 
Lease. Specifically, subparagraph 17.2(c) of the Lease provides, in part, that upon default by 
D&K, including without limitation nonpayment of rent, IHCHS may terminate the Lease by 
written notice. Accordingly, you are hereby notified of the exercise by IHCHS of its option to 
terminate the Lease and of the forfeiture and termination of the Lease.2 In connection with 
IHCHS's decision to terminate the Lease, you are referred to subparagraph 17.2(c) of the Lease, 
which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
1
 By correspondence and in conversations between IHCHS's legal counsel and D&K's lawyers, D&K 
also was made aware of the purchase and assignment. 
2 IHCHS has chosen, at this time, to exercise this option rather than to pursue an action for unlawful 
detainer as provided by the Utah Code. 
*r> South Mate Mnvt. 22nd H«w>r 
Mil LaL i . u \ . Huh > v , i ; U ^ 
(SOh -u:.:«HX) 
D&K Management, Inc. 
April 14,1998 
Page Two 
. . . In the event of such termination, tenant agrees to immediately 
surrender possession of the Demised Premises. Should Landlord 
terminate this Lease, Tenant shall have no further interest in this 
Lease or the Demised Premises and the Landlord may recover from 
the Tenant all damages it may incur by reason of Tenant's breach, 
including [1] the cost of recovering the Premises, [2] reasonable 
attorney's fees, and [3] the worth at the time of such termination of 
the excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges equivalent to 
rent reserved in this Lease for the remainder of the stated term over 
the then reasonable rental value of the Demised Premises for the 
remainder of the state term, all of which amounts shall be 
immediately due and payable at Landlord's election from Tenant to 
Landlord. In determining the rent which would be payable by 
Tenant hereunder subsequent to default, the rent for each year of 
the unexpired term shall be equal to the average Minimum 
Monthly Rent paid by Tenant from the Commencement Date to the 
time of default. 
D&K is hereby directed to surrender possession of the Premises as identified in the Lease 
within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter or May 14,1998. D&K's failure to peaceably 
surrender the Premises in good condition to IHCHS shall cause IHCHS to initiate formal legal 
proceedings to eject D&K and to recover, without limiting the exercise of other rights to which 
IHCHS may be entitled, attorneys' fees allowed under the Lease (see, for instance, Paragraph 
23). 
Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
Sincerely, 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 
^ ^ ^ —
J 
Thomaruripna 
Corporate-Real Estate Manager 
Enclosures 
cc: Douglas Hammer, Esq. (w/encls.) 
Guy P. Kroesche, Esq. (w/encls.) 
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